

BACKHAUL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

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
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SCOPE



- › Backhaul security driving forces
- › Backhaul Security Architecture Options
- › Security Architecture Impact on
 - Implementation complexity
 - Network performance
- › Backhaul security in SDN/NFV era
- › Conclusions


SECURITY DIMENSIONS



A TRUSTED ENVIRONMENT




- › An environment where:
 - the operator has control over both network infrastructure and configurations
 - the transport network is considered secured against attack
 - › Generally, the same TN on which the macro network is deployed
 - the location is physically secured
 - › Secure enclosure and/or a locked room



AN UNTRUSTED ENVIRONMENT



- › An environment where:
 - ‘Public’ networks are used as backhaul
 - The operator has little or no control over the transport network infrastructure and configurations
 - Locations of the small cell is physically exposed



IMPACT OF UNTRUSTED BACKHAUL




› Need IPSec

- To prevent traffic being intercepted between small Cells and Secure Core/OSS Complex
- To 'hide' the infrastructure behind the SecGW


› Need Authentication

- Nodes shall be able to identify themselves both as
 - a) An Vendor node
 - b) An Operator node

› IPSec/Auth supported as an integrated part of the Auto-integration small cells



LTE FROM BH PERSPECTIVE




MACRO BACKHAUL SECURITY

PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTURE




- VLAN separation of bearer and O&M traffic
- IP Subnet separation of bearer and O&M traffic
- Separate routing contexts for bearer and O&M traffic



HETNET BACKHAUL SECURITY


PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTURE



IPSEC CHOICES




- What goes into the IP tunnel?
- How many IP tunnels?
- Where do we terminate the tunnel?



IPSEC SCENARIOS




Single IPsec Tunnel



- › Traffic and OAM through a single IPsec tunnel;
- › 1 VLAN for traffic (S1/X2) and OAM;
- › Same security gateway termination point.


OAM IPsec Tunnel, UP+CP IPsec Tunnel



- › Traffic and OAM on separate IPsec tunnels
- › 1 VLAN for traffic (S1/X2) and 1 VLAN for OAM;
- › May use same or different security gateway termination points.

IPSEC NETWORKING

CASE 1 – E2E INDIVIDUAL TUNNELS



Aggregation Router: Simple Aggregation

Pros:

- Simplicity
- Minimum Management
- Minimum Configuration/Provisioning
- End-to-End Security

Cons:


- High load on IP SeGW
- Maintenance of Certificates
- Local breakout within the Small Cell
- Local breakout security??

X2:

- X2 outside IPsec - Security of X2?
- X2 inside IPsec - X2 performance impact (latency)

IPSEC NETWORKING

CASE 2 – LOCAL SECURITY GATEWAY



Aggregation Router: Enterprise SeGW and IPsec Aggregation

Pros:

- Single IPsec and Single entity to the core
- End-to-end Security via segmented IPsec
- Local Breakout through via Enterprise GW
- Local intelligent functions

Cons:


- Cost and performance of Ent SeGW
- Cost of Core SeGW feature development and new IP design
- Remote SeGW management

X2:

- Can be routed inter-Enterprise by the local SeGW

IPSEC NETWORKING

CASE 3 – ONLY UPLINK TUNNEL



Aggregation Router: Enterprise GW w/o Enterprise IPsec

Pros:

- Simplicity on Enterprise GW
- Inter-Enterprise X2 routing
- Local Breakout through via Enterprise GW or Small Cell
- Local intelligent functions

Cons:


- Outdoor / Indoor Application Security
- Dependency on Enterprise LAN security
- No end-to-end security

X2:

- Can be routed inter-Enterprise by the local GW

SECURITY GW VIRTUALIZATION

VIRTUAL IP SERVICES PLATFORM



CONCLUSIONS



- › Introduction of heterogeneous networks creates an untrusted network environment for service providers.
- › There are multiple implementation options for securing the network environment each with its pros and cons.
- › Virtualization of IP Services provides the opportunity to deploy functions such as the Security Gateway in a flexible and cost efficient manner.



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