The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)

Briefing on Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency

Dr. J.S. Edwards

June 8, 2006



"NSTAC: Enhancing National Security and Emergency Preparedness through Communications"

What is the NSTAC

The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) was created by Executive Order 12382 in 1982, and it is:

- Chartered to provide critical industry–based advice to the President on national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications and information systems matters
- Composed of up to 30 chief executives appointed by the President — members include representatives from leading telecommunications, computer hardware, software and security services, banking, and aerospace companies. NSTAC members represent 95% of the United States telecommunications services
- A successful model of industry–Government collaboration

TEPITF Mission

The NSTAC formed a Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force (TEPITF), which is charged to:

- Determine the NS/EP concerns associated with the interdependency of the telecommunications and electric power sectors, focusing on the operational issues between the two sectors

- Evaluate how these interdependencies will affect the future of the telecommunications network

Near-Term Report

In January 2006, the NSTAC completed recommendations to the President on the current state of telecommunications and electric power interdependencies, including:

- Define and establish the term Emergency Responder within the National Response Plan and other appropriate plans, guidance, directives, and statutes, including other Federal, State, and local Government emergency plans
- Ensure key response personnel of critical infrastructure owners and operators in the telecommunications and electric power sectors be designated as Emergency Responders
- Include fuel supply, security, site access, and other required logistical support to critical telecommunications and electric power infrastructures as part of the Emergency Responder planning process to ensure priority restoration to critical telecommunications and electric power
- Foster and promote effective emergency coordination structures to ensure reliable and robust communication between the two sectors and Federal, State, and local Governments

Long-Term Objective

Define and Review a Long-Term Outage (LTO):

- A **Long Term Outage** (LTO) is defined as an interruption of communications and/or electricity for a period long enough, and within a large enough geographic region, to hamper the provision of telecommunications and electric power even by alternative means. While the start of a LTO may be imprecise, its length would induce serious dependency and interdependency issues with most, if not all, emergency services, Government operations, and other critical infrastructures, although intermittent or isolated service provision may still occur. A LTO requires extensive restoration or reconstitution of the infrastructure to restore even a minimum level of service to the majority of users, and will involve major resource commitments

Long-Term Objective

The Interim report can be found on the NSTAC Web Site at:

- http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac_publications.html

LTO Parameters of Study

The main output of the work will be a Long-Term Report detailing possible interdependency implications of a LTO. This report will recommend a holistic, comprehensive study to further investigate:

- The interdependency issues between the telecommunications and electric power sectors in the event of a LTO
- What can be done before, during, and after to prepare for and efficiently recover from a LTO

Long-Term Report

Possible areas for the future study include:

- The impact, characterization, and systems implications of:
  - An extended electric power outage on the telecommunications sector
  - An extended telecommunications outage on the electric power sector
  - An extended outage of both sectors on each other
- The NSTAC will leverage lessons learned from existing exercises (e.g. Blue Cascades, Pinnacle, Cyberstorm,), but make recommendations to design exercises which are more focused on a long-term failure of these two sectors, a better understanding of dependencies and interdependencies between the two sectors, and the recovery from such an event
- Interdependency and dependency issues as they may occur during an LTO:
  - Conservation measures (e.g. conserve energy) to allow for longer availability of the commodities
  - Re-arrangement of communications and/or electricity services, if possible during a LTO
  - Additional non-invoked power of the Government: What tools could the Federal Government use to improve the LTO situation?

Long-Term Report

Possible areas for the future study (continued):

- Preparation in anticipation of a LTO:
  - Studies and Exercises
  - Technical Science and Technology Alternatives
  - Emergency Planning
  - Mutual Aid Agreement
  - Sharing of Pertinent Information
- The business case for anticipatory remediation:
  - Cost to develop emergency planning, etc. vs. estimated cost of saved resources and time during recovery

Questions ??



"NSTAC: Enhancing National Security and
Emergency Preparedness through Communications"